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Abstract
We provide an overview of some recent progress on the complexity of election
systems. The issues studied include the complexity of the winner, manipulation, bribery,
and control problems.
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1 Introduction
Whether it is “more taste” versus “less filling,” “peanut butter” versus “chocolate,” or
“Bush” versus “Kerry” versus “Nader,” people have varying preferences. So it is natural
that in life preference aggregation, typically via some voting/election scheme, is a central
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and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation’s TransCoop program. In final form, this survey will
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Daniel J. Rosenkrantz, to be published by Springer. Author URLs: www.cs.rochester.edu/u/pfali ,
www.cs.rit.edu/∼ eh, www.cs.rochester.edu/u/lane , and ccc.cs.uni-duesseldorf.de/∼ rothe.
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activity. Within the past few months, the authors of this chapter have seen a department’s
choice for faculty hiring selected by approval voting and a school’s faculty senate election
held under single transferable vote, and of course countless actions have been taken under
plurality rule and under majority rule. Further, in this modern world of processes and
agents, it isn’t just people whose preferences must be aggregated. The preferences of
computational agents must also be aggregated. Indeed, in both the artificial intelligence
and the systems communities a surprisingly broad array of issues have been proposed as
appropriate to approach via voting systems. These issues range from spam detection to web
search engines to planning in multi-agent systems and much more (see, e.g., [ER91,ER93,
PHG00,DKNS01,FKS03]).
Thus it is clear that elections are important in both the human and the computer worlds.
But why should one study the complexity of elections? Although the history of looking at
the effect of computational power on decision-making goes quite far back [Sim69], the true
genesis of the study of the complexity of elections was a spectacular series of papers by
Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick that appeared around 1990 [BTT89b,BTT89a,BO91,
BTT92]. One of the insights that naturally drove Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b]
to study complexity issues is that even if an election system has wonderful mathematical
properties, if determining who won under the election system is computationally intractable
then that system isn’t going to be practically useful. Another motivation for studying
complexity issues comes from a result known then (the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem),
and additional results that have been established since (most notably the Duggan–Schwartz
Theorem), showing that every reasonable election system can be manipulated (see [Gib73,
Sat75,DS00,Tay05]). So better design of election systems cannot prevent manipulation.
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a] brilliantly, thrillingly proposed getting around this
obstacle by seeking to make manipulation exorbitantly expensive, computationally.
The focus areas of those seminal papers from around 1990 were the complexity of the
winner problem, the manipulation problem (which regards affecting an election’s outcome
by changing the votes of voters), and the control problem (which regards affecting an
election’s outcome by changing the structure of the election—e.g., by adding, deleting, or
partitioning voters or candidates). In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of some of
the work done on an ongoing project on election complexity that has been pursued over
the past decade jointly by the theory groups in Du¨sseldorf and Rochester. This project has
focused on improving the field’s understanding of the complexity of winner, manipulation,
and control problems, and has also added new directions of inquiry, including the definition
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and study of election bribery problems. The ultimate goal of the project—which has already
been in reasonable part achieved in its manipulation and bribery streams—is to move from
simply analyzing individual election systems to finding the source of the complexity of
elections. That is, our ultimate goal is to find a simple rule that tells which election
systems (perhaps with our focus limited to some broad, important subclass of systems) are
computationally simple and which are computationally hard with respect to whichever one
of the core questions—winner, manipulation, bribery, or control—is at issue.
By focusing on our own results and interests—though naturally many papers by others
are mentioned in the process—we in no way wish to detract from the rest of the enormous
body of research being done on related and unrelated topics within the complexity of
elections. Indeed, interest in computational social choice theory is at a high level and is still
growing, spans fields and countries, and as this is being written the inaugural meeting of a
devoted workshop—the (First) International Workshop on Computational Social Choice—
is just months away. It is a true, humbling joy to the authors to be part of such a vibrant
community with this shared research passion.
Section 2 briefly describes some major election systems. Section 3 studies work showing
that the winner problems for Dodgson, Kemeny, and Young elections are complete for
parallel access to NP. Section 4 studies work on manipulation and bribery. This work
achieves the “simple classification rule” goal mentioned above, and does so on the most
important class of election systems—scoring protocols. Section 5 is about electoral control,
and studies both the original approach to control and work that extended the control
paradigm to the “destructive” case—asking not whether one can make a preferred candidate
win, but rather asking whether one can block a despised candidate from winning.
2 Elections and Election Systems: Preliminaries
Throughout this chapter, an election, (C, V ), will consist of a finite, though arbitrary in
size, candidate set C and a finite, though arbitrary in size, voter set V . It is legal, though
a bit bizarre, for an election to have no candidates or no voters.
Our voters will, unless otherwise specified, be input as a list. Each voter will not be
associated with a name, but rather will be input simply via his or her preferences over the
candidates. The nature of those preferences depends on the election system. For almost
all the election systems discussed in this chapter, each voter is specified as a tie-free linear
ordering of the candidates, e.g., Bush > Kerry > Nader. We will typically refer to that as
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the voter’s preference list. For some systems discussed in this chapter—approval voting and
k-approval voting—voters are instead specified by approval vectors, namely, a vector that
for each candidate specifies 1 for approval or 0 for disapproval.
As just mentioned, we generally assume that voters are input as a list. So V might
typically be entered as (a natural coding of), for example, the list
(Bush > Kerry > Nader, Nader > Kerry > Bush, Bush > Kerry > Nader).
Note in particular that we do not (except when speaking of succinct versions of problems—
versions where one can list a preference’s multiplicity as a binary number) allow one to
specify multiplicities of a given preference other than by listing the same preference multiple
times. This nonsuccinct approach to input has been the most common one ever since the
seminal work of Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick, and reflects nicely the fact that in real
life ballots are cast one per person.
In some problems we do allow voters to be weighted, but that is quite different than
the succinctness issue. For example, a weight-3 voter is an indivisible object that is
quite different from three weight-1 voters (since the latter can potentially be bribed/not-
bribed/deleted/etc. separately from and differently than each other).
An election system (or election rule) is a mapping that takes as input an election
(C, V ) and outputs a winner set W satisfying ∅ ⊆ W ⊆ C. So, in contrast with a social
choice function, which typically maps from elections to preference-lists-altered-to-allow-ties,
election systems focus completely on separating the candidates into winners and nonwinners.
Nonetheless, the literature on the complexity of election systems is a bit schizophrenic.
Some areas of this literature—such as most of the work on the complexity of winner
problems—focus on the issue of whether a particular candidate is (or can be made to
be) a winner. Other areas of the literature on the complexity of election systems—such
as most of the work on the complexity of control problems—focus on the issue of whether
a particular candidate is (or can be made to be) a unique winner, i.e., to be a winner
and to be the only winner. In the literature on manipulation one finds multiple examples
of focus on winners and of focus on unique winners, but since the seminal manipulation
complexity paper [BTT89a] focused on winners, we will view that as the “traditional”
choice for manipulation.
The abovementioned traditional associations between areas and which of “winner” or
“unique winner” to study are largely a matter of taste and often date back to choices made
in the seminal papers of Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick. One certainly could choose to
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diverge from them, and researchers sometimes do. For example, the appendix of [HHR06]
reanalyzes the complexity of the winnership problems of Dodgson, Kemeny, and Young
elections—whose complexity was previously known for the case of “winner”—for the case
of “unique winner,” and though it takes some work, shows that in each case the complexity
of the unique winner problem is the same as the complexity of the winner problem.
Nonetheless, the traditional choices regarding “winner” versus “unique winner” help
unify the literature so that papers within a given research stream—say, the study of electoral
control—share the same focus and so can be better compared and contrasted. In this
chapter, we respect and follow the traditional choices.
Finally, let us briefly define some of the most important election systems. In approval
voting, each voter is represented by a 0-1 approval vector. To determine the winner, one
component-wise adds the vector from each voter, and all candidates who achieve the largest
component-wise sum that appears are winners. For each k ≥ 1, k-approval voting is the
same as approval voting, except each voter must have exactly k approvals in his or her vote
(and thus we must have ‖C‖ ≥ k).
The most important class of election systems is the class of scoring systems (or scoring
rules or scoring protocols). A scoring system (for m-candidate elections) is defined by
a scoring vector α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) satisfying α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm. Each voter is
represented by a preference list, and the ith most preferred candidate on a given voter’s
preference list gains αi points due to that voter. Each candidate’s point total is the sum of
all the points he or she gets. Whoever gets the highest sum is a winner.
Plurality-rule elections are based on the family of scoring systems defined by the scoring
vectors (), (1), (1, 0), (1, 0, 0), . . ., with the vector appropriate to the number of candidates
being the one that is used. Majority-rule elections technically are not scoring protocols, but
rather are the system using the same scoring vector collection as plurality-rule elections but
in which a candidate wins exactly if he or she gets strictly more than ‖V ‖/2 points. Note
that approval voting technically isn’t a scoring protocol or even a one-scoring-vector-per-
election-size family of scoring protocols. However, for each m ≥ k, m-candidate k-approval
voting is a scoring protocol, based on the vector (
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
m−k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0). Veto elections are based
on the family of scoring systems defined by the scoring vectors (), (0), (1, 0), (1, 1, 0), . . ..
Condorcet elections are the system in which to be a winner one must have the property
that for each candidate d other than oneself it must hold that one is preferred to d by strictly
more than half the voters (i.e., one wins all head-on-head majority-rule beauty contests).
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Such a candidate is called a Condorcet winner.
3 Complexity of Winning: Dodgson’s 1876 Election System
“I suspect that one of the March Hare, the Hatter, and the Dormouse is guilty,” said
the Queen, “though I don’t know which one is. Thus we—the Duchess, you (Alice),
and I—will vote on this matter. Off with the head of any one of the March Hare, the
Hatter, and the Dormouse who is preferred to each of the others in pairwise majority-
rule contests on whom to execute!”
“You cannot do that,” Alice screamed, totally horrified. The Queen replied angrily,
“Yes, I can do that. This is a rational society where people vote rationally on issues. . .
such as which of those three to behead.” And she pointed again to the Hatter, the
March Hare, and the Dormouse (who had fallen asleep). “My preference list as to
whom to behead is Hatter (I hate him) > March Hare > Dormouse (he is so cute). So
shall it be off with the Hatter’s head?”
“Not so fast,” said the Duchess. “My preference list for whom to behead is March Hare
(oh, to rid this world of those creepy long ears!) > Dormouse > Hatter.” Suddenly
turning to Alice, she asked, “What’s your vote?” Alice timidly replied, “If I absolutely
must give a list, then my preference list as to whom to behead is Dormouse > Hatter >
March Hare.”
“Ha!” exclaimed the Queen. “The Hatter is preferred to the March Hare for execution
by two to one. Off with the Hatter’s head!” “No,” replied the Duchess, “the Dormouse
is preferred to the Hatter for execution by two to one.” “Then off with the Dormouse’s
head!” cried the Queen. “No,” said the Duchess, “the March Hare is preferred to the
Dormouse for execution by two to one.” “Then kill the March Hare!” screamed the
Queen, now really quite upset. “Need I remind you,” said Alice, “that the Hatter is
preferred to the March Hare for execution by two to one? So no one shall be beheaded.”
The Queen summarized, “This makes me dizzy. In our rational society, each of the
three of us had noncyclic (rational) preferences over these three candidates. And yet
when we aggregated our preferences under pairwise majority-rule contests, our societal
preference was strictly cyclic: March Hare > Dormouse, Dormouse > Hatter, Hatter >
March Hare. Our rational individual preferences aggregated to an irrational societal
preference. Since as the Queen I represent the society, perhaps the only fitting penalty
is ‘Off with my head!’ ”
Lewis Carroll—whose real name was Charles L. Dodgson and who not only was the
author of wonderful children’s books but also was a mathematician—noticed the same issue
the Queen just reached: Rational individual preferences (even with ties not allowed) can
aggregate, under pairwise majority-rule contests, to an irrational societal preference. That
is, Dodgson rediscovered what is known today as the Condorcet paradox, though he most
likely was unaware (see [Bla58, pp. 193–194]) of Condorcet’s much earlier work [Con85].
Note that every election instance having this type of strict cycle over all the candidates
6
in the aggregate behavior is a case where there is no Condorcet winner (though not every
election instance having no Condorcet winner is a case of this type of strictly cyclic aggregate
behavior). In his 1876 essay “A Method of Taking Votes on More than Two Issues,”
Dodgson [Dod76] proposed an election system that respects Condorcet winners when they
exist, and when they don’t exist reflects the philosophy that whoever is “closest” to being
a Condorcet winner should be declared a winner. In Dodgson’s system, given an election
(C, V ), each candidate c ∈ C is assigned a score (denoted by dscore (C,V )(c), and we will
write just dscore (c) when the election is clear from context): dscore (c) equals the smallest
number of sequential exchanges (called “switches” henceforward) of adjacent candidates in
the voters’ preference lists that suffices to make c a Condorcet winner. Whoever has the
lowest Dodgson score wins in Dodgson’s system. When a Condorcet winner exists, he or
she is clearly the unique candidate with Dodgson score zero and thus is a (indeed, the)
Dodgson winner as well.
In the above example, there is no Condorcet winner but switching the Hatter and the
Dormouse in Alice’s preference list yields Hatter > Dormouse > March Hare. So the Hatter
now defeats both the March Hare and the Dormouse by two to one in pairwise majority-
rule contests and thus is now a Condorcet winner (in the election for the questionable
privilege of being beheaded). So in the above example dscore (Hatter) = 1. Similarly,
dscore (March Hare) = dscore (Dormouse) = 1. If there is no Condorcet winner, Dodgson
winners are not necessarily unique, though at least one Dodgson winner always exists in
Dodgson elections (except when ‖C‖ = 0 ∨ (‖V ‖ = 0 ∧ ‖C‖ 6= 1) holds).
How hard is it to determine whether a distinguished candidate is a Dodgson winner
of a given election? Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] crisply, naturally formalized
this problem as follows and also defined two related problems, the scoring and ranking
problems for Dodgson elections. A Dodgson triple (C, c, V ) consists of an election (C, V )
and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C.
Name: Dodgson-winner.
Given: A Dodgson triple (C, c, V ).
Question: Is c a Dodgson winner in (C, V ), i.e., does dscore (c) ≤ dscore (d) hold for each
d ∈ C?
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Name: Dodgson-score.
Given: A Dodgson triple (C, c, V ) and a nonnegative1 integer k.
Question: Is it the case that dscore (c) ≤ k?
Name: Dodgson-ranking.
Given: An election (C, V ) and two distinguished candidates from C, c and d.
Question: Is it the case that dscore (c) ≤ dscore (d)?
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] proved that Dodgson-score is NP-complete and
that Dodgson-ranking and Dodgson-winner are NP-hard. For the latter two problems
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick left open whether their lower bounds were optimal, i.e., whether
their Dodgson-ranking and Dodgson-winner NP-hardness results could be strengthened to
NP-completeness or, alternatively, whether their NP-hardness lower bounds could be raised,
ideally to some matching upper bound. These open questions were resolved by the following
result of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR97a].
Theorem 3.1 ([HHR97a]) Dodgson-ranking and Dodgson-winner are Θp2-complete.
Θp2 here represents, as is standard, a particular level of the polynomial hierarchy. P
NP
‖
is the level of the polynomial hierarchy formed by the class of problems solvable by parallel
(i.e., truth-table) access to NP. Quite early, Papadimitriou and Zachos [PZ83] studied
PNP[log], the class of problems solvable by O(log n) sequential (i.e., Turing) queries to NP.
However, it is now known that PNP[log] and PNP‖ are equal [Hem89], and the class they each
define is often referred to as the Θp2 level of the polynomial hierarchy. There are surprisingly
many characterizations of Θp2 (see [Wag90])—a tribute to its robustness under definitional
variation. From the definitions, Θp2 is easily seen to be related to other polynomial hierarchy
levels as follows: NP ∪ coNP ⊆ Θp2 ⊆ P
NP ⊆ NPNP ∩ coNPNP.
The remainder of this section is mainly devoted to sketching the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Our proof sketch proceeds via a series of lemmas. The general proof structure is shown in
Figure 1.
The Θp2 upper bounds for Dodgson-ranking and Dodgson-winner are easy to see.
Dodgson-ranking, for example, is in Θp2 via the simple algorithm that, given an instance
((C, V ), c, d), uses the NP oracle Dodgson-score to compute dscore (c) and dscore (d) by
1Both [BTT89b] and [HHR97a] have “positive” here rather than “nonnegative,” but it is easy to see that
the NP-completeness of this problem is unaffected by that word change (basically because the k = 0 case
can be tested for in polynomial time).
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Θp
2
-hard
via Lemma 3.6:
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elections
Figure 1: Proof structure for Theorem 3.1.
asking in parallel all plausible values of those scores, and by doing so will discover whether
dscore (c) ≤ dscore (d).
Regarding the lower bounds, we show Dodgson-ranking and Dodgson-winner Θp2-
hard by proving many crucial properties of/operations on Dodgson elections to be easy,
i.e., we provide polynomial-time algorithms for them. Although this may at first seem
counterintuitive, it in fact is natural: Showing that a problem A is ≤pm-hard for a class
reflects not just that A has the power to solve all the sets from the class, but also that A
is so nicely and simply structured that a polynomial-time many-one reduction from each
set in the class can tap into that power. So ≤pm-hardness is itself about simplicity and the
power of polynomial-time transformations.
In our setting, some of the easiness results we obtain will be used hand-in-hand with
a Θp2-hardness tool of Wagner ([Wag87], see also the surveys [HHR97b,RR06]), stated as
Lemma 3.2 below. Along the lines of the previous paragraph, to link our problems to this
tool we must explore the properties of Dodgson elections and in particular how to resculpt
them via efficient algorithms.
Lemma 3.2 ([Wag87]) Let A be an NP-complete set, and let B be any set. Then B is Θp2-
hard if there is a polynomial-time function f such that, for all k ≥ 1 and all x1, . . . , x2k ∈ Σ
∗
satisfying χA(x1) ≥ χA(x2) ≥ · · · ≥ χA(x2k), it holds that ‖{i | xi ∈ A}‖ ≡ 1 (mod 2) ⇐⇒
f(x1, . . . , x2k) ∈ B.
To exploit Lemma 3.2, we have to do much groundwork. Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [BTT89b] proved Dodgson-score NP-hard via a reduction from
exact-cover-by-three-sets. However, their reduction does not have the properties
needed to exploit Lemma 3.2. In contrast, one can achieve these properties by
constructing a reduction to Dodgson-score that starts from the well-known NP-complete
problem three-dimensional-matching (see Garey and Johnson [GJ79] for specifics on
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three-dimensional-matching), which we will for brevity henceforward refer to as 3DM. This
reduction has the property—which is vastly more restrictive than what is needed merely to
achieve a vanilla many-one reduction in this case—that when it reduces to a question about
whether a certain candidate has score at most k in a given election, it will always be the
case that that candidate’s true score in that election is either k or k + 1.
Lemma 3.3 ([HHR97a]) There is a polynomial-time function f that reduces 3DM to
Dodgson-score in such a way that, for each x ∈ Σ∗, f(x) = ((C, c, V ), k) is an instance of
Dodgson-score with an odd number of voters and this instance has the property that: (a) if
x ∈ 3DM then dscore (c) = k and (b) if x 6∈ 3DM then dscore (c) = k + 1.
Next, Lemma 3.4 shows how to “sum” Dodgson triples in such a way that the Dodgson
score of the “sum” equals the sum of the Dodgson scores of the given Dodgson triples.
Lemma 3.4 ([HHR97a]) There is a polynomial-time function dodgsonsum such that,
for all ℓ and for all Dodgson triples (C1, c1, V1), (C2, c2, V2), . . . , (Cℓ, cℓ, Vℓ) each having
an odd number of voters, dodgsonsum((C1, c1, V1), (C2, c2, V2), . . . , (Cℓ, cℓ, Vℓ)) = (C, c, V )
is a Dodgson triple with an odd number of voters and satisfies dscore(C,V )(c) =∑
1≤j≤ℓ dscore(Cj ,Vj )(cj).
We now define an ancillary problem that is closely related to Dodgson-ranking and
Dodgson-winner.
Name: two-election-ranking (2ER, for short).
Given: Two Dodgson triples, (C, c, V ) and (D, d,W ), with c 6= d and ‖V ‖ odd and ‖W‖
odd.
Question: Is it the case that dscore (C,V )(c) ≤ dscore (D,W )(d)?
Lemmas 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 can be used (together with about two pages of additional
argumentation) to obtain Lemma 3.5. Note that 2ER plays the role of the set B in
Lemma 3.2, and 3DM plays the role of that lemma’s NP-complete set A. Note also that
2ER is in Θp2, so Lemma 3.5 implies that 2ER is Θ
p
2-complete.
Lemma 3.5 ([HHR97a]) 2ER is Θp2-hard.
Finally, Lemma 3.6 shows how to merge two Dodgson elections into a single Dodgson
election in a very careful way such that a number of useful properties are achieved. Using this
lemma we can transfer 2ER’s Θp2-hardness to both Dodgson-ranking and Dodgson-winner.
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One can think of Lemma 3.6, informally, as akin to a “double-exposure” photograph:
Our merged election retains and reflects important information about both its underlying
elections.
Lemma 3.6 ([HHR97a]) There are polynomial-time functions merge and merge ′ such
that, for all Dodgson triples (C, c, V ) and (D, d,W ) for which c 6= d and both ‖V ‖ and ‖W‖
are odd, there exist Ĉ and V̂ such that
1. merge((C, c, V ), (D, d,W )) = ((Ĉ, V̂ ), c, d) is an instance of Dodgson-ranking,
2. merge ′((C, c, V ), (D, d,W )) = (Ĉ, c, V̂ ) is an instance of Dodgson-winner,
3. dscore ( Ĉ,V̂ )(c) = dscore(C,V )(c) + 1,
4. dscore ( Ĉ,V̂ )(d) = dscore(D,W )(d) + 1, and
5. for each e ∈ Ĉ − {c, d}, dscore
( Ĉ,V̂ )
(c) < dscore
( Ĉ,V̂ )
(e).
Space is too tight to cover in detail here the nine pages of proofs for Lemmas 3.3
through 3.6 and Theorem 3.1. But to give the reader at least some flavor of how the proofs
work, we illustrate by an example the construction used for proving Lemma 3.6. Let the
Dodgson triples (C, c, V ) and (D, d,W ) be given, where C = {a, b, c} and D = {d, e, f},
V contains three preference lists, c > b > a, a > c > b, and b > a > c, and W contains
one preference list, f > e > d. Clearly, dscore (C,V )(c) = 1 and dscore (D,W )(d) = 2. Now
construct the election (Ĉ, V̂ ), which is part of the output of the functions merge and merge ′,
as follows. The candidate set is Ĉ = C ∪D ∪ S ∪ T , where S and T are sets of so-called
separating candidates.2 Voter set V̂ consists of the following preference lists:
1. c > b > a >
−→
S > e > f >
−→
T > d,
2. a > c > b >
−→
S > e > f >
−→
T > d,
3. b > a > c >
−→
S > e > f >
−→
T > d,
4. f > e > d > a > b >
−→
T > c >
−→
S ,
5. d > e > f > a > b >
−→
T > c >
−→
S ,
2To make the proof of Lemma 3.6 work in general, S and T have to be chosen sufficiently large. In this
toy example, however, all properties hold even if ‖S‖ = ‖T‖ = 0, so all separating candidates could be
dropped here.
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6. d > c >
←−
T > e > f > a > b >
−→
S ,
7. d > c >
←−
T > e > f > a > b >
−→
S , and
8. c > d >
−→
T > e > f > a > b >
−→
S ,
where
−→
S (respectively,
−→
T ) represents the candidates of S (respectively, T ) in some fixed
order, and (to avoid interference regarding property 5 of the lemma)
←−
T represents the
candidates of T in the order that reverses their order in
−→
T . The first three voters in V̂
simulate V , the fourth voter simulatesW , and the remaining voters are so-called normalizing
voters. Properties 1 and 2 of Lemma 3.6 are immediate.
For properties 3 and 4 of Lemma 3.6, let us determine the Dodgson scores of candidates
c and d in (Ĉ, V̂ ). Note that one switch in, say, the second voter of V̂ (which is one of the
voters simulating V ) gives the new preference list c > a > b >
−→
S > e > f >
−→
T > d, and one
switch in, say, the sixth voter of V̂ (a normalizing voter) gives c > d >
←−
T > e > f > a >
b >
−→
S . By these two switches, c has become a Condorcet winner, so dscore
(Ĉ,V̂ )
(c) ≤ 2.
But since c needs to gain one vote in (Ĉ, V̂ ) against each of a and d to defeat all candidates
by a strict majority, no single switch in the preference lists of V̂ can make c a Condorcet
winner, so dscore (Ĉ,V̂ )(c) ≥ 2. Thus dscore (Ĉ,V̂ )(c) = 2 = dscore (C,V )(c) + 1. Similarly,
two switches in the fourth voter of V̂ (which simulates W ) gives the new preference list
d > f > e > a > b >
−→
T > c >
−→
S , and one switch in the eighth voter of V̂ (a normalizing
voter) yields d > c >
−→
T > e > f > a > b >
−→
S . By these three switches, d has become a
Condorcet winner, so dscore
(Ĉ,V̂ )
(d) ≤ 3. Again, since d needs to gain one vote in (Ĉ, V̂ )
against each of c, e, and f to defeat all candidates by a strict majority, no two switches
in the preference lists of V̂ can make d a Condorcet winner, so dscore (Ĉ,V̂ )(d) ≥ 3. Thus
dscore (Ĉ,V̂ )(d) = 3 = dscore (D,W )(d) + 1. Property 5 uses similar arguments.
As mentioned earlier, Dodgson’s system respects the Condorcet winner when a
Condorcet winner exists. Since the notion of Condorcet winner is widely considered
central and important, election systems with this property have been intensely studied
(see Fishburn [Fis77]). Some other examples of election systems respecting the notion
of Condorcet winner are those of Young [You77] and Kemeny [Kem59,KS60]. In Young’s
system, whoever can be made a Condorcet winner by removing the smallest number of voters
wins. Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel [RSV03] proved that the winner problem for Young
elections is Θp2-complete, via a reduction from the problem maximum-set-packing-compare.
Kemeny’s winners are defined via the notion of a “Kemeny consensus.” Each ranking of
the candidates (with ties allowed) that is “closest” to the given preference lists of the voters
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with respect to a certain distance function is a Kemeny consensus. A candidate is a winner
in a Kemeny election if there exists some Kemeny consensus in which that candidate is a
winner (a highest-ranked candidate, though possibly tied for that position). Hemaspaandra,
Spakowski, and Vogel [HSV05] proved that the winner problem for Kemeny elections is Θp2-
complete, via a reduction from the problem feedback-arc-set-member.
The three Θp2-completeness results discussed above pinpoint the complexity of the winner
problems for Dodgson, Young, and Kemeny elections. Winners in these three systems are
not necessarily unique and these three winner problems ask whether a given candidate is a
winner. However, as mentioned earlier, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR06]
have shown that the unique winner problems for Dodgson, Young, and Kemeny elections
are Θp2-complete as well.
Θp2-completeness suggests that the relevant problem is far from being efficiently
solvable, and there are many ways in which completeness for this higher level of the
polynomial hierarchy speaks more powerfully than would completeness for its kid brother,
NP [HHR97b]. Since checking whether a given candidate has won should be in polynomial
time in any system to be put into actual use, these results show that Dodgson, Young,
and Kemeny elections are unlikely to be useful in practice. However, we note that
winnership in “homogeneous” Young elections can indeed be tested in polynomial time
via integer linear programming [You77], that Dwork et al. [DKNS01] have proposed an
efficient heuristic (called “local Kemenization”) regarding the Kemeny winner problem,
and that Dodgson winners can be determined efficiently (a) for elections with a bounded
number of candidates or voters [BTT89b], (b) in Fishburn’s [Fis77] homogeneous variant
of Dodgson elections [RSV03], and (c) with a guaranteed high frequency of success under a
simple greedy heuristic [HH06].
4 Complexity of Manipulation and Bribery: Scoring Systems
and Dichotomy Theorems
The previous section studied the complexity of winner problems for certain election systems.
We in this section turn to electoral problems that formalize attempts to influence an
election’s outcome for the case of a group of manipulative voters (who strategically change
their preference lists) and for the case of having someone trying to bribe voters to change
their preference lists. The next section studies attempts to influence elections via altering
their structure. For a given election system, one would naturally most hope to find that it
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has an easy winner problem but that it resists electoral manipulation, bribery, and control.
Unfortunately, voters may often be tempted to cast their votes not according to their
true preferences but rather insincerely, based on strategic considerations. Consider the
following example. Our voting system is the Borda count, a family of scoring protocols
that for m candidates uses the scoring vector α = (m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 0). We have three
candidates, a, b, and c, and eleven voters, where five voters have preference list a > b > c,
five voters have preference list b > a > c, and one voter has preference list c > a > b. Under
the Borda count scoring procedure, candidate a receives 16 points, candidate b receives 15
points, and candidate c receives 2 points. So a is the unique winner. However, from the
point of view of voters with (true) preference list b > a > c, it might be tempting to report
b > c > a instead. This way they might actually make b win. Namely, if all voters whose
sincere preference list is b > a > c were to instead cast b > c > a as their votes (and all
other votes were to remain unchanged), then b would become the unique winner.
Of course, we would like to have election systems that cannot be manipulated.
Unfortunately, a powerful line of work shows that all practically useful systems operating
on three or more candidates are open to manipulation. In particular, the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite Theorem [Gib73,Sat75] shows that for each nondictatorial election system
that always selects exactly one winner and in which the candidate set is of size at least
three and in which for each candidate there is some set of votes that make that candidate a
winner, there exists some situation in which a single strategic voter has an incentive to vote
insincerely. The Duggan–Schwartz Theorem ([DS00], see also [Tay05]) obtains an analog
of this for the model in which—as in this paper—the winner set is some subset (possibly
empty, possibly nonstrict) of the candidate set.
Although manipulation cannot be absolutely precluded in any reasonable election system
on three or more candidates, Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a,BO91] ingeniously
proposed to at least make it computationally prohibitive—e.g., NP-hard—for a manipulator
(or in later work by others, a coalition of manipulators) to figure out whether (and how)
his/her/their vote(s) can be modified so as to make a given candidate win. They found
systems vulnerable to manipulation (i.e., one can tell in polynomial time whether and
how a given candidate can be turned into a winner) and they found systems resistant to
manipulation (i.e., systems for which the manipulation problem is NP-hard). This line of
research has been very actively pursued ever since (see, as just a few of the many examples
on or related to this, [CS02,CLS03,EL05,HH05,FHH06,PRZ06,PR06]). As mentioned
in the introduction, complexity issues for electoral problems (in particular, manipulation
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problems) are particularly important in these modern times when preference aggregation is
used in multi-agent systems, distributed computing, and internet applications.
A problem closely related to manipulation is bribery. In (constructive) manipulation, a
group of manipulators wants to, by setting their own preference lists, have a given candidate
end up a winner. (Destructive manipulation, which analogously seeks to have a given
candidate end up a nonwinner, has also been studied [CS02,CLS03]. This section deals
with the constructive case only.) Bribery is related to manipulation, except that now we
look at elections from the point of view of an outside agent who wants to make some
candidate win and who has some budget to bribe voters to change their votes. We now
formally define these problems for a given election system E .
Name: E-manipulation.
Given: A set C of candidates, a set V of nonmanipulative voters, a set S of manipulative
voters with V ∩ S = ∅, and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C.
Question: Is there a way to set the preference lists of the voters in S such that, under
election system E , c is a winner of election (C, V ∪ S)?
Instead of the plain E-manipulation problem presented above, we often are interested in
the E-weighted-manipulation problem in which voters, both in V and S, have weights. (In
this version of the problem, the set S is usually represented simply as a list of weights of
the manipulators.)
The bribery problem for election system E is defined similarly, except that in bribery
the set of voters who can change their preference lists is not part of the input. Intuition
might say that bribery thus is more difficult than manipulation, but in fact that is not
necessarily the case. We will see (and [FHH06] has a full treatment) that some bribery
problems are NP-complete yet their manipulation analogs are in P, some bribery problems
are in P yet their manipulation analogs are NP-complete, and sometimes both problems are
equally complex.
Name: E-bribery.
Given: A set C of candidates, a set V of voters, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a
nonnegative integer k.
Question: Is it possible to change the preference lists of at most k voters such that, under
election system E , c is a winner of election (C, V )?
Bribery also has its weighted version, E-weighted-bribery. In addition, bribery can come
in a few other natural flavors. In particular, in E-$bribery we associate each voter with a
15
price tag and interpret the integer k as a budget, and we ask whether it is possible to make
c a winner by changing the preference lists of voters whose total price does not exceed k. If
the voters have both price tags and weights then we call the problem E -weighted-$bribery.
Sometimes we also put special restrictions on how to represent weights or prices, and will
indicate such restrictions by subscripts.
Throughout this section we will be interested only in manipulation and bribery problems
that ask about making the distinguished candidate a winner (as opposed to a unique
winner—though we mention in passing that, very often, analogous results hold for both
cases, see [FHH06]).
In the remainder of this section we present the flavor of some recently obtained results
on manipulation and bribery. We point out that in this section we discuss manipulation
and bribery together as if they had been developed at the same time, but this is not
really the case. The complexity of manipulation has long been studied, but the study of
the complexity of bribery in elections started very recently. Nonetheless, the relationships
between these two families of problems are very interesting and natural, and we feel that it
is more instructive to present these results together.
One approach to the study of manipulation and bribery would be to study these
questions one election system at a time. Let us for a moment do that—by focusing
on one of the best-known and most popular election systems, plurality-rule elections—
though we will soon seek to wrap many of these results about plurality-rule elections into
a broader framework that allows insights into hardness to span many systems. Recall from
Section 2 that a plurality-rule election with m candidates is described by the scoring vector
(1,
m−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), so only the top candidate in each preference list matters.3 First note that, not
surprisingly, plurality-rule elections are easy to manipulate.
Theorem 4.1 ([BTT89a]) plurality-manipulation and plurality-weighted-manipulation
are in P.
3There is one issue that one should be aware of when discussing families of scoring protocols such as
plurality, veto, or Borda count. Formally, each scoring protocol regards only a fixed, constant number of
candidates. When we refer to names such as plurality, veto, and Borda count we typically have in mind the
whole family of protocols that involves one incarnation of a particular scoring protocol for each candidate
set multiplicity. Thus when we discuss the complexity of plurality-rule elections here, we actually give
polynomial-time algorithms that are polynomial both in the number of voters and candidates.
In contrast, when we are discussing scoring protocols in general, we as is standard consider a particular
scoring vector and thus a fixed number of candidates. This makes NP-completeness results stronger
and polynomial-time membership results weaker. However, we note in passing that Hemaspaandra and
Hemaspaandra [HH05, Section 3] provide a formalism and a dichotomy (i.e., complete classification) result
for manipulation under uniform families of scoring protocols.
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To prove this theorem, it is enough to observe that if the manipulators want c to become
a winner then they should vote for c. ([BTT89a] discusses only the unweighted manipulation
problem, but clearly weights do not change anything here.)
Now that we know the complexity of manipulating plurality-rule elections, it is natural
to ask about the complexity of bribery within such elections. Does the fact that in bribery
one has to find some group of voters whose votes are to be changed make the problem more
difficult? The answer is no.
Theorem 4.2 ([FHH06]) plurality-bribery is in P.
A greedy algorithm works for plurality-bribery. If we want to make c a winner by bribing
at most k voters, we first test whether c is a winner already. If so, we are done. Otherwise,
if k > 0 then we pick one of the current winners, bribe one of his or her voters to vote for c,
decrease k by one (if k becomes negative, this means that we used too many bribes and so
c cannot be made a winner), and loop back to testing whether c is a winner already.
This algorithm is very simple and natural. Unfortunately, it does not work for the
weighted case or for the case of priced voters. In the weighted case it is not always clear
whether one should first bribe the heaviest voter of some current winner or just the globally
heaviest voter who does not yet vote for c. In the latter case we get the greatest additional
vote weight for c, but in the former case we gain some vote weight for c while simultaneously
potentially decreasing the total vote weight that c needs to become a winner. (We say
“potentially decrease” since if there are multiple winners then the total vote weight c needs
to win won’t change. But if we keep on bribing the voters of current winners, this decrease
will occur eventually.) Let us consider the following example (see Figure 2). We have
candidates a, b, and c and six voters with weights 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, and 3. Both voters with
weight 3 have a as their top candidate, and all the others have b as their top candidate. Thus
a receives a total vote weight of 6, b receives a total vote weight of 7, and c receives no votes.
If we bribe the two heaviest voters—the two weight-3 voters preferring a—then c still loses
to b. However, if we bribe one weight-3 voter preferring a and one weight-2 voter preferring
b then c wins. Examples where bribing the heaviest voters leads to an optimal bribery also
exist. This hints that plurality-weighted-bribery may require more than a simple greedy
algorithm. Nonetheless, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [FHH06] obtained
polynomial-time algorithms for plurality-weighted-bribery and plurality-$bribery.
Theorem 4.3 ([FHH06]) plurality-weighted-bribery and plurality-$bribery are in P.
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(a) Election with weighted
voters.
(b) Bribing the two heaviest
voters to vote for c.
(c) Optimal bribery: Both c
and b win.
Figure 2: Plurality-rule elections where bribing the heaviest voters does not lead to optimal
bribery.
Does this mean that bribery for plurality-rule elections is always in P? Again the answer
is no. If voters are weighted and have price tags then the problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.4 ([FHH06]) plurality-weighted-$bribery is NP-complete.
This theorem follows by a fairly simple reduction from the partition problem, which is
the problem that asks, given a multiset of k nonnegative integers, whether the multiset can
be partitioned into two multisets that each sum to the same value.
Theorems 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 capture the complexity of manipulation and bribery
for plurality-rule elections, showing in particular how the complexity of bribery problems
eventually jumps to NP-completeness as we make the setting more and more challenging.
However, one can pinpoint the jump’s location even more precisely. We have been
assuming as our default that all the numbers within our problems (i.e., the weights
and the prices) are represented in binary. What if we represent these numbers in
unary? Let plurality-weightedunary-$bribery be the plurality-weighted-$bribery problem
with weights represented in unary and let plurality-weighted-$briberyunary be the
plurality-weighted-$bribery problem with prices encoded in unary. Using a dynamic-
programming approach, [FHH06] showed that these problems are in P. What this shows is
that the plurality-weighted-$bribery’s NP-completeness hangs by the slenderest of threads:
Informally put, if either the weights or prices are represented by fairly small numbers, the
problem slips into P.
Theorem 4.5 ([FHH06]) plurality-weighted-$briberyunary and plurality-
weightedunary-$bribery are in P.
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The above results on manipulation and bribery for plurality-rule elections capture the
complexity of these problems in many important settings. However, as mentioned in the
introduction, a far more satisfying goal is to find some simple rule that determines for which
election systems bribery and manipulation problems are easy and for which election systems
they are hard. Such general results, which we are going to present now as Theorems 4.7
and 4.10 and Corollary 4.9, are known as dichotomy results.
Conitzer and Sandholm [CS02] observed that, for an election system E for which the
winner problem is in P, if the voters are unweighted and there are a fixed number of
candidates then E-manipulation is in P. This result holds because a manipulator can
easily evaluate all possible manipulations. The result yields the following corollary (which,
though not explicitly stated in [CS02], should naturally be attributed to that paper). For
a scoring vector α, let α-manipulation (respectively, α-weighted-manipulation) denote the
(weighted) manipulation problem and let α-bribery (respectively, α-weighted-bribery and
α-weighted-$bribery) denote the (weighted and weighted-plus-priced) bribery problem with
respect to the scoring protocol that uses α.
Corollary 4.6 ([CS02]) For each scoring vector α, α-manipulation is in P.
Can we obtain a sharp, easy-to-use classification result with respect to manipulation
for scoring protocols with weighted voters? Conitzer, Lang, and Sandholm [CS02,CLS03]
took some first steps in this direction. In particular, they observed that for each m ≥ 3,
(
m−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1, 0)-weighted-manipulation (this is m-candidate veto) and (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0)-
weighted-manipulation (this is m-candidate Borda count) are NP-complete. (Note that for
two candidates both the Borda count and veto are equivalent to plurality-rule elections, since
they all have the same scoring vector, (1, 0).) Although certainly interesting, these results
don’t reach the goal of classifying the complexity of weighted manipulation for all scoring
protocols. The problem of full classification was recently solved by Hemaspaandra and
Hemaspaandra [HH05], who obtained the following dichotomy theorem for scoring protocols
with respect to α-weighted-manipulation. (The 3-candidate case—and some other cases—of
the Hemaspaandra–Hemaspaandra manipulation dichotomy work has been independently
obtained by Procaccia and Rosenschein [PR06]. The 3-candidate special case has also
been independently obtained in an unpublished manuscript of Conitzer, Sandholm, and
Lang [CSL05].)
Theorem 4.7 ([HH05]) Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring vector. If α2 = · · · = αm then
α-weighted-manipulation is in P. In all other cases, this problem is NP-complete.
19
This result clarifies a few things. In particular, it shows that plurality-rule elections
are in fact quite special among scoring protocols, and it shows why scoring protocols tend
to jump to NP-completeness at 3 candidates (in particular, the results on veto and Borda
count mentioned in the previous paragraph are special cases of Theorem 4.7). Due to space
limitations, we omit the proof of Theorem 4.7, which proceeds by a reduction from the
partition problem.
Theorem 4.7 is a crisp, natural example of how one can obtain complete characterization
results (admittedly, with respect to scoring protocols) regarding the computational
complexity of manipulation. It would be great to be able to translate this result from the
context of manipulation to that of bribery, in the hope of getting a complete characterization
result for bribery. A natural first step would be an attempt to prove, for example, that
all bribery problems for each given election system are at least as hard as the respective
manipulation problems. Unfortunately, if we want to capture all possible election systems
then such a result is impossible. For example, for approval voting the manipulation problem
is in P (all manipulators simply approve of just the candidate they are seeking to make win,
and no one else), but bribery for approval voting is NP-complete [FHH06]. On the other
hand, [FHH06] also constructs an (artificial) election system in which the opposite happens:
The bribery problem is in P and the manipulation problem is NP-complete. However, if
we stay in the realm of scoring protocols then some extremely useful translations from
manipulation to bribery are possible.
First, one can observe that if voters have price tags then bribery is just a generalized
manipulation. (As an easy exercise, the reader is encouraged to show that this holds.) The
following theorem is a slightly weakened version of a result from [FHH06].
Theorem 4.8 ([FHH06]) For each scoring vector α, α-weighted-manipulation is ≤pm-
reducible to α-weighted-$bribery.
Taking Theorems 4.7 and 4.8 together and by inspecting the reduction that underlies
the proof of Theorem 4.4, we can obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.9 ([FHH06]) Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring vector. If α1 = · · · = αm
then α-weighted-$bribery is in P. In all other cases, this problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.8 is not entirely satisfactory. Although it translates results on manipulation
problems to results on bribery problems, this translation comes at the cost of introducing
price tags for voters. In fact, a much stronger translation can be obtained. In particular,
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using the proof of Theorem 4.7, with much work and problem-reduction trickery, the
following dichotomy theorem for weighted bribery with respect to scoring protocols can
be shown.
Theorem 4.10 ([FHH06]) Let α = (α1, . . . , αm) be a scoring vector. If α2 = · · · = αm
then α-weighted-bribery is in P. In all other cases, this problem is NP-complete.
Note that this theorem essentially replaces the word “manipulation” in Theorem 4.7
with the word “bribery.” However, achieving this replacement is far from trivial. The proof
follows by first observing that the reduction used in [HH05] can be tweaked to, instead
of mapping from the partition problem, map from a restricted version of the partition
problem that in effect causes the reduction to produce instances of manipulation problems
with certain very special properties. These properties ensure that instances of these
manipulation problems can, almost verbatim, be interpreted as instances of the analogous
bribery problems.
The above discussion presents results that interrelate bribery and manipulation, and we
have seen that doing so helps us obtain broad dichotomy results for bribery. We conclude
by mentioning some open problems regarding bribery and manipulation.
One open direction is to seek dichotomy results whose range of applicability is broader
than the class of scoring protocols. As mentioned earlier, [HH05, Section 3] already handles
uniform families of scoring protocols. However, one may hope for even more broadly
applicable results. A second open direction is to consider approximation algorithms. This
makes sense, for example in the case of bribing priced voters. We would certainly like to
know what the cheapest way is of making our preferred candidate a winner by bribery, but
we would also be quite satisfied with a cost that—though not the best—is close to optimal.
Are there approximation algorithms for plurality-weighted-$bribery or α-weighted-$bribery,
where α is some scoring vector? If there are such approximation algorithms for these
problems then perhaps there even are polynomial-time approximation schemes. Ideally, we
would like to obtain a dichotomy result that crisply classifies each scoring protocol as having
or not having a polynomial-time approximation scheme. We hope this section will serve as
an invitation to the reader to tackle these open problems.
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5 Complexity of Control: Making Someone Win or Keeping
Someone From Winning
The previous section covered manipulation and bribery. Although manipulation and bribery
are somewhat different issues, they both have the property that only the voted preferences
are changed. The structural properties of the election are not changed.
In real life, however, many attempts to influence elections work by seeking to change the
structural properties of elections. By structural changes, we refer to such actions as adding
candidates, deleting candidates, adding voters, deleting voters, partitioning candidates, and
partitioning voters. The term control is used to describe issues related to influencing an
election’s outcome by changing its structure.
We mention in passing that many real-world attempts to influence elections are attempts
to simultaneously influence the structure of an election and influence the way voters vote.
For example, when an advertisement for candidate c appears on television, it may be
simultaneously trying to get voters who most favor d to switch to c, and to get people
who already most prefer c but weren’t planning on voting to make the effort to go and vote.
However, research papers on complexity typically study manipulation and control issues
separately. The study of bribery is somewhat of an exception, as bribery, though akin to
manipulation, is an atypically flexible form of manipulation, due to the manipulated voters
not being fixed as part of the problem input. For this reason, to many people (including the
authors) bribery feels somewhat control-like in addition to being very manipulation-like.
For reasons of space, this section will cover control, but with very little stress on formality
or even on stating results individually, and instead will simply present an informal discussion
about control. We will particularly try to point out what the real-life inspirations are for
each type of control. We should warn the reader that in doing so we are taking liberties. For
example, we will use as examples some recent American presidential elections. However, in
reality, American presidential elections operate under a subtle and obscure system (deeply
related, in fact, to partitioning of voters) known as the Electoral College, rather than by
direct election by plurality rule. In our informal examples, we will often willfully ignore this
and speak as if a presidential election were simply a big plurality-rule election.
We will often discuss both the constructive case—seeking to make a preferred candidate
(uniquely) win—and the destructive case—keeping a despised candidate from being a
(unique) winner. The complexity of constructive control was first studied in a seminal paper
of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92]. The study of destructive control was initiated much
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more recently, namely, in work of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR05]. We
mentioned in the introduction that in some subareas of electoral research the focus is on
winning and in some the focus is on being the unique winner. For the study of control—
in both the constructive and destructive cases—the focus has always been on the case
of making a candidate be, or not be, a unique winner. Thus, throughout this section,
when speaking of our problems or referring to results, when we say (and for brevity and
grace we will always just say) winner/wins/winning/etc., we always implicitly mean unique
winner/uniquely wins/uniquely winning/etc. (the only exception regards the paragraph
below on tie-handling rules for subelections, since that directly addresses what happens in
subelections when there are tied winners). It is very important to keep this shorthand in
mind, since in this section when we say things such as “you can tell whether a despised
candidate can be precluded from winning,” we always mean “you can tell whether a despised
candidate can be precluded from being the unique winner (namely, by either not being a
winner at all or by being part of a group of two or more winners).”
Let us start with the issue of control by adding candidates. Formally viewed as a set (as
all these problems are when seeking rigorous results), this becomes, with respect to some
election system E , the sets E-constructive-control-by-adding-candidates and E-destructive-
control-by-adding-candidates. The former is defined as follows.
Name: E-constructive-control-by-adding-candidates.
Given: A set C of original candidates, a pool D of potential additional candidates, a
distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters with preferences over C ∪D.
Question: Is there a set D′ ⊆ D such that, under election system E , c ∈ C is a winner of
the election having candidates C ∪D′ with the voters being V with the preferences of
V restricted to C ∪D′?
That is, can we add some of the additional candidates and by doing so make c a winner?
As a real-life motivating example, regarding the 2000 American presidential election, if one
wanted George W. Bush to win (and Ralph Nader was not at that time running) one might
have chosen to add the candidate Ralph Nader if one believed that that would split voters
away from Al Gore and achieve one’s desired outcome. E-destructive-control-by-adding-
candidates is defined with the identical “Given” field, but its question regards, naturally,
not trying to make a preferred candidate win but rather making a despised candidate not
win:
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Name: E-destructive-control-by-adding-candidates.
Given: A set C of original candidates, a pool D of potential additional candidates, a
distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters with preferences over C ∪D.
Question: Is there a set D′ ⊆ D such that, under election system E , c ∈ C is not a winner
of the election having candidates C ∪D′ with the voters being V with the preferences
of V restricted to C ∪D′?
The same real-life motivating example works here, except shifted to the case of focusing
on an organization who despised Gore and wanted simply to see him not win.
From here on, we often won’t formally describe the problems as sets, but will leave the
descriptions very informal (even though in our results table we will refer to the formal sets).
Interested readers can find the detailed, formal descriptions in [BTT92,HHR05]. We will
also, until the results table, stop mentioning E explicitly.
Just as one can study control by adding candidates, one can similarly study control
by deleting candidates. The input is C, V , c ∈ C, and a natural number k, and in the
constructive case one wants to know whether by deleting at most k candidates one can
make c a winner, and in the destructive case one wants to know whether by deleting at
most k candidates (with the deletion of c forbidden) one can ensure that c is not a winner.
The same motivating example as above works here. For example, for the constructive case,
in both the 2000 and 2004 American presidential elections, some people who wanted Al
Gore or John Kerry to win sought to convince/urge/pressure Ralph Nader to withdraw
from the race. (Regarding the destructive case, many people whose view was “Anyone but
Bush” also naturally wanted Ralph Nader to withdraw.)
Turning to the problems of control by adding voters and control by deleting voters
(typically treated as separate, though in the real world these issues interact), in control by
adding voters (respectively, control by deleting voters), one asks whether by adding at most
k from a pool of additional voters (respectively, by removing at most k of the initial voters)
a given election will make c a winner (constructive case) or not a winner (destructive case).
A real-world motivation here for considering the case of adding voters is so-called get-out-
the-vote efforts. A political party, on the day of an election, might send vans to bring to the
polls voters who the party believes favor its candidate but who might without the vans not
make the effort to show up and vote. Or a political party might air ads designed to energize
some part of its base and get them to decide to show up and vote (e.g., by putting an ad
in CACM saying “That other party’s candidate, Marty Meanie, if elected will put a tax on
every line of code, with a surtax on comment lines. Only by voting can you help prevent
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that terrible future!”). One real-world motivation for having the case of deleting voters is
less openly admitted by parties and groups today, but is widely viewed as occurring: vote
suppression efforts. A party might run ads designed to sap the will to get-out-to-vote of
the base of its key opponent. Or if one were a media outlet favoring Gore in 2000 and one
went on the air and called Florida for Gore while voting was still going on in the more
conservative Panhandle part of Florida, that might lead voters in that part of the state not
to show up and cast their (more conservative) votes, since they would believe that the state
was already a lost cause (here, we are taking into account the Electoral College structure
of that election).
Control by voter addition/deletion is also, in a wider view of affairs, related to
disenfranchisement—that is, it is related to the issue of which broad groups are, under
law, allowed/not-allowed to vote and what hurdles (sometimes via requirements and
sometimes via intimidation) are used to in effect prevent broad groups from voting. Using
American history for examples, some cases—ranging in modern-day acceptance from the
overwhelmingly accepted to the overwhelmingly deplored—of direct exclusions under law
include the facts that (today and in the past) children are not allowed to vote, that (today
and in the past) resident aliens are not allowed to vote in most elections, that (today and
in the past) felons lose their federal vote for life, that (until 1961) citizens living in the US
seat of government weren’t represented in the Electoral College (and so didn’t influence
presidential elections), and that (in the past) women and slaves—and in many Southern
states all African-Americans—were not allowed to vote. Some American historical cases of
exclusion-in-effect via requirements include poll taxes and literacy tests.
For reasons of space, we won’t go into detail in defining the various partition schemes,
but we mention that partition attempts regarding both voters and candidates occur often
in real life. In these schemes, we have more than one voting round, having to do with
partitions of the candidates or the voters. We give only examples of the latter, as those are
particularly natural. As a first such example, every time an American state legislature does
a Congressional redistricting, it may be a type of prepackaged attempt to partition by voters:
In a typical redistricting, the dominant party tries to make sure that in as many districts as
possible it has enough supporters to hold the seat but not so many supporters as to waste
their votes by winning that seat with too much support. (The side that doesn’t control the
legislature usually refers to such redistricting via the pejorative term “gerrymandering.”)
As another example of partition by voters, in some American states in elections for various
state-wide officials—say, for their US senator—candidates are chosen by separate party
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primaries in which only members of each given party vote. Then only the winners of those
primaries participate in the final election, in which all the registered voters can vote (to
make this example work, let us assume that in this state there are no independent voters).
When dealing with partition schemes, one must have some rule as to what happens
when there is a tie in a subelection. In the results table later, following [HHR05] which first
studied these tie-handling models in this context, we use TP (“ties promote”) to indicate
the rule that all people who tie as winners move forward from subelections, and we use
TE (“ties eliminate”) to indicate the rule that only unique winners of subelections move
forward. Note that the tie-handling rules affect just the subelections, not the final election
round of a given partition system (which as is conventional in the study of electoral control
always focuses on unique winnership).
This concludes our presentation of the standard types of electoral control. With each
existing for both the constructive case and the destructive case, the standard types of control
are adding candidates, deleting candidates, adding voters, deleting voters, and, though we
did not discuss them in any detail here, three types of partition schemes with each of those
three occurring in both the TP and the TE models. So, in brief, there are ten standard types
of constructive control, and each of those ten also has a destructive control analog. Each
of these twenty control problems is (for each fixed election rule) simply a set. And that set
is either computationally easy (meaning it is easy given an instance to decide whether the
desired outcome can be achieved using that type of control) or that set is computationally
hard (meaning it is hard—say, NP-hard—given an instance to decide whether the desired
outcome can be achieved using that type of control).
Indeed, the study of the complexity of electoral control looks at these issues in almost
exactly those terms, but with one twist. That twist regards the easy problems. In particular,
there are two very different ways a problem might be easy. Consider an election system and
a particular type of control for which the type of control at issue can never change someone
from not being a winner to being a winner within that election system. In that case, the
formal control problem (assuming the winner problem—recall that by that we in this section
implicitly mean the unique winner problem—for that election system is in P) of course is
in P, but for a very uninteresting reason. In that case, we say the problem is immune to
constructive control: The given type of control can never shift one’s preferred candidate from
not winning to winning. Immunity to destructive control is defined analogously: The given
type of control can never shift one’s despised candidate from winning to not winning. If a
problem is not immune and is in P, then we say it is vulnerable. So when vulnerability
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plurality Condorcet approval
control by construct. destruct. construct. destruct. construct. destruct.
adding-candidates R R I V I V
deleting-candidates R R V I V I
partition- TE: R TE: R V I TE: V TE: I
of-candidates TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
run-off-partition- TE: R TE: R V I TE: V TE: I
of-candidates TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
adding-voters V V R V R V
deleting-voters V V R V R V
partition- TE: V TE: V R V TE: R TE: V
of-voters TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: V
Table 1: Results on constructive and destructive control. The problem’s name is implicitly
described by the table, e.g., the top right “V” refers to the case approval-destructive-control-
by-adding-candidates. Results due to Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] are italicized.
Results due to Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR05] are in boldface. Key:
I = immune, R = resistant, V = vulnerable, TE = ties-eliminate, TP = ties-promote.
holds for a type of control, then that type of control (since immunity does not hold)
sometimes actually makes a profound difference, and in polynomial time we can tell whether
a given instance is one where the desired constructive or destructive electoral outcome can
be achieved. Although knowing that there exists some way to achieve the desired outcome is
different from knowing some such way, it turns out that for every vulnerability result stated
in our forthcoming results table, Table 1, there is an algorithm that not just determines
when control can be exerted, but that also gives the exact control actions to take in order to
exert the desired control. Finally, if a control problem is not immune and is NP-hard, then
we say it is resistant to control. Although immunity is the most desirable case (at least
if one is not seeking to exert control, but rather is an election-system designer seeking to
frustrate those wishing to influence outcomes via control), resistance is also a very desirable
case—it means that the general problem of determining whether a given election instance
can be controlled is computationally intractable (NP-hard). Although not all NP-hard
problems are NP-complete, for every resistance result in our forthcoming results table an
NP upper bound is obvious, so each resistance result of the table in fact represents an NP-
completeness claim. (We mention in passing that in the literature election systems that are
not immune to a given type of control—that are either vulnerable or resistant to it—are
said to be susceptible to that type of control.)
We said earlier that we would not stress results, but it certainly makes sense to see
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what is known. Table 1, which is taken from [HHR05], summarizes results on constructive
and destructive control. These results are due to Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92]
and Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR05], and are about just the collection
of election systems that those papers studied. Regarding open directions, we urge the
reader to study the control problems of other election systems and to seek to find in a
broader way what it is that makes some control problems computationally easy and some
computationally hard.
From Table 1, some interesting observations are clear. There are settings immune to
constructive control that are vulnerable to destructive control. Condorcet elections with
respect to control by adding candidates is one such example. Perhaps somewhat more
surprisingly, there also are settings immune to destructive control that are vulnerable to
constructive control. Approval elections with respect to control by deleting candidates are
one such example. Quite interestingly, there are settings vulnerable to destructive control
yet resistant to constructive control. In these, you may not be able to efficiently tell whether
your favorite candidate can be made to win, but you can efficiently tell whether a despised
candidate can be precluded from winning. Condorcet elections with respect to control by
adding voters is one such example. Also very interesting is that tie-handling rules can make
a tremendous difference. For example, for plurality-rule elections with respect to control by
partition of voters, vulnerability holds in the “ties eliminate” model but resistance holds in
the “ties promote” model.
Finally, the most glaring observation is that for not one of the systems is it the case that
resistance-or-immunity to control holds under all the twenty studied control attacks (ten
constructive and ten destructive). Each system studied has good properties (immunity
or resistance) under some attacks, but has bad properties (is vulnerable) under other
attacks. In fact, at the time the table’s work on control was completed (early 2005),
no system was proven to be immune-or-resistant to all twenty types of control (or even
to the ten constructive types, or to the ten destructive types). However, recently, work
of Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR06] has shown how to “hybridize”
collections of elections in a way such that the hybrid election has a polynomial-time winner
problem if all its constituent systems have polynomial-time winner problems, yet the hybrid
system is resistant to every one of the twenty types of control to which one or more of its
constituent systems is resistant. Simply put, the hybridization scheme combines strengths
without adding weaknesses. From that work it now is known that there is an election
system (admittedly, an artificial one, since it is built by hybridizing enough systems—some
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of which had to be constructed just for that purpose—to have, between them, all the right
underlying resistances) that is resistant to all twenty standard types of electoral control yet
has a polynomial-time winner problem.
6 Conclusions
This chapter has surveyed some recent progress in the complexity of elections, focusing
primarily on providing an overview of some of the results obtained to date in an ongoing
collaborative research project between Du¨sseldorf and Rochester. The authors firmly believe
that the study of elections is a showcase area where interests come together spanning such
CS specialties as theory, systems, and AI and such other fields as economics, business,
operations research, and political science. And within the study of elections, the central
importance of complexity/algorithmic issues has emerged more clearly with each passing
year. Complexity offers a nonclassical yet powerful tool to frustrate those who seek to
manipulate or control electoral outcomes. Nonetheless, much remains to be learned. In
this chapter’s sections, we have tried to point out in passing some of the questions that
seem to us the most interesting and urgent. We commend these questions, and this entire
area of study, to all readers and most especially to those younger readers seeking a research
area that is fresh, promising, enjoyable, theoretically well-grounded, and well-connected to
societal applications.
Acknowledgments We thank S. S. Ravi and Sandeep Shukla for inviting us to contribute
to the Festschrift in honor of Dan Rosenkrantz for which this was written, and we thank
Dan Rosenkrantz for his tremendous contributions to the field and his sterling example to
all.
References
[Bla58] D. Black. Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press,
1958.
[BO91] J. Bartholdi, III and J. Orlin. Single transferable vote resists strategic voting.
Social Choice and Welfare, 8(4):341–354, 1991.
29
[BTT89a] J. Bartholdi, III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. The computational difficulty of
manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227–241, 1989.
[BTT89b] J. Bartholdi, III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. Voting schemes for which it can be
difficult to tell who won the election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(2):157–165,
1989.
[BTT92] J. Bartholdi, III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 16(8/9):27–40, 1992.
[CLS03] V. Conitzer, J. Lang, and T. Sandholm. How many candidates are needed to
make elections hard to manipulate? In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on
Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pages 201–214. ACM Press,
July 2003.
[Con85] J.-A.-N. de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet. Essai sur l’Application de L’Analyse
a` la Probabilite´ des De´cisions Rendues a` la Pluralite´ des Voix. 1785. Facsimile
reprint of original published in Paris, 1972, by the Imprimerie Royale.
[CS02] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Complexity of manipulating elections with
few candidates. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 314–319. AAAI Press, July/August 2002.
[CSL05] V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, and J. Lang. When are elections with few candidates
hard to manipulate? Unpublished manuscript, January 2005.
[DKNS01] C. Dwork, S. Kumar, M. Naor, and D. Sivakumar. Rank aggregation methods for
the web. In Proceedings of the 10th International World Wide Web Conference,
pages 613–622. ACM Press, March 2001.
[Dod76] C. Dodgson. A method of taking votes on more than two issues, 1876. Pamphlet
printed by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, and headed “not yet published”.
[DS00] J. Duggan and T. Schwartz. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or
shared beliefs: Gibbard–Satterthwaite generalized. Social Choice and Welfare,
17(1):85–93, 2000.
[EL05] E. Elkind and H. Lipmaa. Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting. In
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
30
and Data Security, pages 285–297. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer
Science #3570, 2005.
[ER91] E. Ephrati and J. Rosenschein. The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among
automated agents. In Proceedings of the 9th National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 173–178. AAAI Press, 1991.
[ER93] E. Ephrati and J. Rosenschein. Multi-agent planning as a dynamic search for
social consensus. In Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, pages 423–429. Morgan Kaufmann, 1993.
[FHH06] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. The complexity of
bribery in elections. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 641–646. AAAI Press, July 2006.
[Fis77] P. Fishburn. Condorcet social choice functions. SIAM Journal on Applied
Mathematics, 33(3):469–489, 1977.
[FKS03] R. Fagin, R. Kumar, and D. Sivakumar. Efficient similarity search and
classification via rank aggregation. In Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMOD
International Conference on Management of Data, pages 301–312. ACM Press,
June 2003.
[Gib73] A. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica, 41(4):587–601,
1973.
[GJ79] M. Garey and D. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory
of NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979.
[Hem89] L. Hemachandra. The strong exponential hierarchy collapses. Journal of
Computer and System Sciences, 39(3):299–322, 1989.
[HH05] E. Hemaspaandra and L. Hemaspaandra. Dichotomy for voting systems.
Technical Report TR-861, Department of Computer Science, University of
Rochester, Rochester, NY, April 2005. Journal version to appear in Journal
of Computer and System Sciences.
[HH06] C. Homan and L. Hemaspaandra. Guarantees for the success frequency of
an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners. In Proceedings of the 31st
31
International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science,
pages 528–539. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science #4162,
August/September 2006.
[HHR97a] E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Exact analysis of Dodgson
elections: Lewis Carroll’s 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to
NP. Journal of the ACM, 44(6):806–825, 1997.
[HHR97b] E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Raising NP lower bounds
to parallel NP lower bounds. SIGACT News, 28(2):2–13, 1997.
[HHR05] E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Anyone but him: The
complexity of precluding an alternative. In Proceedings of the 20th National
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 95–101. AAAI Press, July 2005.
[HHR06] E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Hybrid elections
broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control. Technical Report TR-900,
Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, June
2006. Revised, August 2006. Conference version to appear in Proceedings of the
20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2007).
[HSV05] E. Hemaspaandra, H. Spakowski, and J. Vogel. The complexity of Kemeny
elections. Theoretical Computer Science, 349(3):382–391, 2005.
[Kem59] J. Kemeny. Mathematics without numbers. Dædalus, 88:571–591, 1959.
[KS60] J. Kemeny and L. Snell. Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences. Ginn,
1960.
[PHG00] D. Pennock, E. Horvitz, and C. Giles. Social choice theory and recommender
systems: Analysis of the axiomatic foundations of collaborative filtering. In
Proceedings of the 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages
729–734. AAAI Press, 2000.
[PR06] A. Procaccia and J. Rosenschein. Junta distributions and the average-case
complexity of manipulating elections. In Proceedings of the 5th International
Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 497–
504. ACM Press, May 2006.
32
[PRZ06] A. Procaccia, J. Rosenschein, and A. Zohar. Multi-winner elections: Complexity
of manipulation, control, and winner-determination. In Preproceedings of
the Eighth Trading Agent Design and Analysis & Agent Mediated Electronic
Commerce Joint International Workshop (TADA/AMEC 2006), pages 15–28,
May 2006.
[PZ83] C. Papadimitriou and S. Zachos. Two remarks on the power of counting. In
Proceedings 6th GI Conference on Theoretical Computer Science, pages 269–276.
Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science #145, January 1983.
[RR06] T. Riege and J. Rothe. Completeness in the boolean hierarchy: Exact-
four-colorability, minimal graph uncolorability, and exact domatic number
problems—a survey. Journal of Universal Computer Science, 12(5):551–578,
2006.
[RSV03] J. Rothe, H. Spakowski, and J. Vogel. Exact complexity of the winner problem
for Young elections. Theory of Computing Systems, 36(4):375–386, 2003.
[Sat75] M. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and
correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions.
Journal of Economic Theory, 10(2):187–217, 1975.
[Sim69] H. Simon. The Sciences of the Artificial. MIT Press, 1969. Second edition, 1981.
[Tay05] A. Taylor. Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation. Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
[Wag87] K. Wagner. More complicated questions about maxima and minima, and some
closures of NP. Theoretical Computer Science, 51(1–2):53–80, 1987.
[Wag90] K. Wagner. Bounded query classes. SIAM Journal on Computing, 19(5):833–
846, 1990.
[You77] H. Young. Extending Condorcet’s rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 16(2):335–
353, 1977.
33
